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September, 1954
The Water Board's misapprehension of its authority stems
from two sources. First, realizing that the Charter could have given
the Board legislative power-which of course a legislature could
not do-the Board too readily concludes that it has done so. Sec-
ond, because of its preconceived belief that it has legislative power,
the Board misinterprets the Charter, attaching no significance to
the words, "in the matter of".
The Board is by Charter given authority to acquire, conduct
and operate a water system and everything incidental thereto, and
to make rules and regulations for the use and distribution of
water. This cannot be considered a grant of general legislative
power. It is a grant of authority similar to that in the Diaz case,
supra, given to the Commissioner of Airport Management. The
Water Board is an administrative agency of the people of Den-
ver-no more.
Being an administrative agency, we must look to the case
law to determine whether the Board has authority to make penalty
regulations. From the cases we learn that unless an agency is
specifically given authority to make penalty regulations, it can-
not do so.
With the exception of penalizing for late payment or non-
payment of water bills, the Charter gives the Water Board no
authority to make penalty regulations. Therefore, it would seem
that the penalty regulation of June 24th is invalid.
THE POWER OF THE DENVER WATER BOARD
TO ENACT PENALTY REGULATIONS
LEE HAMBY*
On June 24, 1954, the Board of Water Commissioners of the
City and County of Denver supplemented their rules and regula-
tions with the following rule, set forth below in full:
Whenever the management shall discover a use of
water contrary to the rules and regulations of the Board,
a notice of such misuse shall be given to the occupant of
the premises where the misuse occurs informing the oc-
cupant of the time and type of misuse. Whenever during
a calendar year a second occurrence of misuse shall be
found at any premises, a special charge of five dollars
($5.00) shall be imposed upon those premises without
regard to whether or not the second misuse was of the
same or a different character than the first. Notice of
such charge shall be given to the occupant at the time of
such second misuse. In case of a third misuse during
the same calendar year, a similar procedure shall be fol-
lowed but the special charge shall be twenty-five dollars
Student, University of Denver College of Law.
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($25.00). If further misuse occurs, similar procedures
shall be followed but thereafter the special charge shall
be one hundred dollars ($100.00) on each occasion of
misuse.
The rule was apparently adopted in order to enforce other
recent regulations by which the hours during which lawns could
be irrigated were sharply restricted. An examination of the rules
and regulations as a whole has shown that all rules relating to
use of water are designed to prevent waste. The awareness of
the value of economy of water was, of course, brought about by
the impending critical shortage of water due to the general climatic
conditions in this area.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the power of the
Board of Water Commissioners to assess the special charge de-
scribed in the rule. The special charge will be treated herein as
a pecuinary penalty, since it bears no relationship to the cost of
the water, is coercive in nature, and is increased with each vio-
lation.
Before discussing the structure and powers of the Board, it
is necessary to consider the operation and effect of rules and regu-
lations of water systems in general.
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF WATER COMPANIES
A privately owned water company has the right to formulate
reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of its business,
in order to protect itself against injury and fraud. This right is
said to be inherent in the company because of the relationship of
vendor-vendee that exists between the company and its customers,
and because of the very nature of its business, as a utility im-
pressed with a public interest. A water company operating under
a franchise enjoys a legally recognized monopoly to supply a vital
necessity of life, and it cannot go out of business without permis-
sion from the legislative authority of the area it serves. Because
of its obligation to remain in business and to supply its cus-
tomers' needs to the best of its ability, it must necessarily have
the power to protect its property and its business by means of
reasonable rules and regulations binding upon its customers.1
It appears to be generally accepted that a water company
may enforce its rules and regulations by discontinuing or refusing
service. If the rule is reasonable, the consumer will not be en-
titled to damages he might incur as a result. Such action by the
water companies is frequently taken for failure to pay or refusal
to pay, but service has also been discontinued if the fixtures and
appliances do not meet the requirements of the company's regula-
tions, or if water is put to an unauthorized use.2 It-might be ob-
served that discontinuance of service is a nonpecuniary penalty
of extraordinary severity.
'56 Am. Jur. 569, § 84 et seq.
2 67 Corpus Juris 1228, § 760.
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The rules and regulations must be fair and reasonable, and
not arbitrary and unjust. In the relationship of supplier and con-
sumer the company has the superior position by reason of its
ability to withhold service from those who fall under its disfavor.
Therefore, the legislative branch of the government may, by the
exercise of its police power to protect the public health, welfare,
and safety, intervene to protect the consumers from fraud and
oppression. It may establish the rates for which water is fur-
nished, based upon a fair return from a reasonable valuation.
3
It may prohibit the operation of rules and regulations if they are
unfair, oppressive, extortionary, or unjust.4 It may enact ordi-
nances regarding the use of water to preserve sanitary and other
standards conducive to good public health.5
Since the supply of water to a municipality or a municipal
area is a matter of local concern, the regulatory powers are vested
in the city council or legislative department of the city. Thus it
has been held that a rule of a water company which amends,
abrogates, or changes a city ordinance, or one which is repugnant
to its charter, cannot be adopted. The city council may exercise
the regulatory powers itself, or it may delegate this duty to a
commission or some other administrative body.
A municipality owning and operating its own water plant
does so in its proprietary, as opposed to its governmental capacity.6
As such it has the same powers and is subject to the same restric-
tions as a private company. There appears to be no distinction
between the two. If a municipal water company enacts a regula-
tion in its proprietary capacity, that is, a rule that a private com-
pany would be empowered to make by virtue of its inherent pow-
ers, it can have no more effect than a regulation of a private
company. A water company as such acquires no additional regu-
latory powers by reason of municipal ownership alone.
7
When a municipality acquires its own water plant, one must
remain aware of the distinction between its proprietary and gov-
ernmental powers. On the one hand, it conducts the operations
in its quasi-private capacity, in a manner consonant with sound
business judgment, having due regard for the public character of
its charge. On the other, it exercises its police power to protect
the public health, welfare, and safety by protection of the con-
sumer against unfair and extortionary rates and unreasonable and
oppressive rules; and in addition it may pass ordinances control-
ling the use of water to protect the public health, this latter func-
tion being of no legitimate concern to the waterworks as a busi-
ness. The creation, duties, and powers of the Board of Water
Commissioners must be viewed against this background.
3 Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U. S. 178 (1918).
'12 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations 375, 3rd edition 534-120.
'Ibid.
'Ibid. Ch. 35.
Ibid. § 34, 120.
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THE BOARD OF WATER COMMISSIONERS
Prior to 1918, the water supply for the residents of Denver
was supplied by the Denver Union Water Company, a privately
owned corporation. In that year, after years of negotiation and
litigation not here material, the voters of Denver, by charter
amendment, authorized the purchase of 'the existing waterworks,
and a bond issue to provide payment therefore. 8
By the same amendment, there was created "a non-political
board of water commissioners of five members, to have complete
charge and control of a water works system and plant for sup-
plying the city and county of Denver and its inhabitants with
water for all uses and purposes; . . . " The Board was "to have
and exercise all the powers given to the public utilities commis-
sion . . . of the city and county of Denver by Article XIX of the
charter" as amended. (The public utilities commission was created
to have control of the public utilities of Denver and was author-
ized to acquire a water works system). The Board was to "have
and exercise all the powers of the city and county granted by the
constitution and laws of the state of Colorado and by the charter,
in the matter of purchasing, acquiring, constructing, leasing, ex-
tending and adding to, maintaining, conducting and operating a
water works system for all uses and purposes, and everything
necessary, pertaining, or incidental thereto."
It was further provided that "It shall fix the rates for which
water shall be furnished for all purposes, and shall provide rules
and regulations relative to the use and distribution thereof." The
rates were to be "as low as good service will permit," and roughly
equivalent to the cost of operations, maintenance, and better-
ments. The Board "shall provide penalties for failure to pay
promptly and for non-payment."
Upon reading the amendment as a whole, the Board of Water
Commissioners emerges as more than just a water company and
also more than just an administrative agency. There can be no
doubt that the Board was given complete charge and control of
all the proprietary functions of the water company, With all the
powers implicit in its operation. In addition, it was given a por-
tion of the legislative powers in regard to rates, and rules and
regulations. As we have seen, the municipality ordinarily acts
in its governmental capacity to fix rates (fair return based on a
reasonable valuation) and as a negative check on abuse of con-
sumers by unreasonable rules and regulations. The provision re-
garding rate-fixing, and the one regarding rules and regulations,
with standards to be applied for the rates, in the context in which
they are found, must be construed as meaning that those legisla-
tive functions were taken from the City Council and vested in
the Board of Water Commissioners. In other words, the Board
was intended to act in a dual capacity: (1) as proprietors of a
water works, and (2) as a legislative and regulatory body.
'Municipal Code, Charter, § 297B.
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It is not within the scope of this paper to explore the prob-
lems of the power of the City Council, in which the legislative
power is vested,9 to fine for violations of water regulations or to
adopt the rules and regulations of the Board en masse as police
ordinances. It is noted that the City Council has enacted an ordi-
nance forbidding the waste of water,10 and providing that "any
use of water in violation of a rule or regulation of the Board of
Water Commissioners is conclusively presumed to be unlawful." 11
For the purposes of this paper suffice it to say that if the conserva-
tion of water is a proprietary function, the Board has power to
make and enforce a corrective regulation, and the City Council
has no power to enforce an ordinance to the same effect; and if
the conservation of water is a governmental function, the reverse
is true.
Prevention of waste of water should be considered a pro-
prietary function. To consider this matter in the proper perspec-
tive we must return to the analogy of the privately owned water
company. Technically it sells water service; water is the physical
subject matter of its business. It has possession, at least, if not
legal ownership of water en route to the customers. Its very
business is the efficient and equitable distribution of water, sub-
ject to additional duties imposed by operation of law. It has the
duty of treating all customers alike, and to insure a safe and pure
supply. The primary responsibility of conserving and if need be,
rationing water rests upon the company as a natural and logical
business operation.
The day to day operations and practices of a water company
are illustrative of this. A moment's reflection will show that
meters are primarily a device for enforcing a policy of conserving
water. The amount of water used has little relation to the cost
of the service furnished. In an aggravated case of waste, it can-
not be doubted that the company has the power to discontinue its
service until the situation is corrected. Rates themselves are fre-
quently designed to discourage inefficient use.
In City of Englewood v. City and County of Deiver, 2 citizens
of Englewood, buying water from Denver, sought unsuccessfully
to enjoin the following action: "In 1948, Denver, through its
Board of Water Commissioners, notified the Englewood consumers
that an increase of thirty per cent in the flat rate would be in-
voked and would prevail until such time as the consumer would
install meters." That case involved the sale of water outside of
the city on a yearly basis, allowed by the Charter.13 The court
refused to declare Denver a public utility as to outside consumers,
pointing out that the Colorado Public Utilities Commission had
already correctly decided it had no jurisdiction over the municipal
Municipal Code, Charter, § 209.
Municipal Code, Ordinances, § 850.13-I.
"Ibid, § 850.13-2.
"123 Colo. 290, 295, 229 P. 2d 667, (1951).
"3Municipal Code, Charter, § 297B.
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water system in municipal Denver. The court further said: "In
the matter here involved, Denver has acted in its proprietary or
quasi-private capacity, as distinguished from the exercise of gov-
ernmental power beyond the municipal boundary."
It can be seen that the injury to the public by a shortage of
water would be due to the failure of the company to efficiently man-
age and maintain its business. Water companies are charged with a
positive duty to know their business,'to know the supply and con-
sumption of water, and to guide their operations accordingly.
If a water company, whether private or municipal, were com-
pelled to rely upon the legislative body of their service area to
enforce their rules as to waste of water, it would be caught in a
cruel dilemma. If the council failed to act, or did not act as
strenuously as the situation required, the business of the company
would become seriously impaired, and possibly wrecked, with
resulting loss and disaster to the community it is pledged to serve.
And such a situation would be radically different from the ordi-
nary type of legislative controls. Instead of a negative check
against oppressive and unfair practices, or the enactment of police
ordinances on matters solely relating to the public health and
safety, it would mean the introduction of the police court as an
integral part of a business enterprise.
The rule in question, considered with the rules and regula-
tions as a whole, is no more than a provision for a private and
commercial penalty attached to the regulations of the Board. As
such, it is subject to the substantive law of private penalties, and
not to the requirements of due process as applied to city ordinances.
Under Art. XX, Sec. 6, of the Colorado Constitution, there
appears to be a complete delegation of legislative powers to the
home-rule cities as to matters of local and municipal concern.
Once the power is found to exist, that is, that the subject matter
is one of local or municipal concern, the same presumption of valid-
ity would attach as would be applicable to acts of the state legis-
lature. If the. end is legitimate, and the means adopted are reason-
ably calculated to achieve that end, the act cannot be overthrown.
On the other hand, penalties are not favored in the law. The
law will not ordinarily uphold a penalty between private parties
unless there is a showing that a necessity exists for the imposi-
tion of one, and that the amount of the penalty is appropriately
balanced with the wrong threatened. No attempt is made in this
article to determine the reasonableness of the rule in question.
It might be said in its behalf that it has two factors in its favor:
(1) the specter of unfair profit is not present to deter the courts,
as the Board is not in business for gain; (2) it has whatever addi-
tional force it may acquire by the presumption raised by the
Board's approval in its regulatory capacity. On the other hand,
the amount is unusually high, particularly the hundred dollar part,
and may have to undergo some modification.
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